












May2003Regional Specialization, Urban Hierarchy,
and Commuting Costs∗
Takatoshi Tabuchi† and Jacques-François Thisse‡
29 July 2003
Abstract
We consider an economic geography model of a new genre: all
ﬁrms and workers are mobile and their agglomeration within a city
generates rising urban costs through competition on a land market.
When commuting costs are low (high), the industry tends to be ag-
glomerated (dispersed). With two sectors, the same tendencies prevail
for extreme commuting cost values, but richer patterns arise for inter-
mediate values. When one good is perfectly mobile, the corresponding
industry is partially dispersed and the other industry is agglomerated,
thus showing regional specialization. When one sector supplies a non-
tradeable consumption good, this sector is more agglomerated than
the other. The corresponding equilibrium involves an urban hierar-
chy: a larger array of varieties of each good is produced within the
same city.
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11 Introduction
The degree of urbanization that characterizes modern economies is such that
housing and commuting costs, which we call urban costs,s t a n df o ral a r g e
(in fact, the main) share in consumers’ expenditure. In developed countries,
they account for more than one third of individual incomes and may even
reach one half of them. To take an example, in France the share of housing
and transport costs have increased from 23.4 to 42% in consumers’ budget
from 1960 to 2000 (Rignols, 2002). In addition, both urban economics and
empirical evidence show that such costs rapidly increase with city size. For
example, French data show that in 2000 urban costs stand for about 45% of
individual incomes in large cities, but for 34% in the small ones. Similar data
c o u l db ep r e s e n t e df o ro t h e rc o u n t r i e sa n de x p l a i nw h yw ec o n s i d e ru r b a n
costs as one of the main forces pushing toward the geographical dispersion
of activities in modern economies.
The primary purpose of this paper is, therefore, to show how preference
for variety on the demand side and increasing returns on the supply side
interact with urban costs to shape the space-economy.1 Thus, our thought
experiment will be on commuting costs (per unit of distance) because they are
critical to understand how modern space-economies are organized, especially
when trade costs have reached the low level that now prevails. Commuting
costs have also vastly decreased during the 20th century, due mainly to the
development of rapid transits (Mills and Hamilton, 1994, pp.21-30) and the
growing adoption of individual cars (Glaeser and Kahn, 2004), but remain
substantial when we account for the value of time spent in commuting.2 In
order to achieve our goal, we use the framework of economic geography but
modify it in several important respects with the aim of embodying more
relevant forces in the process of intercity trade and city formation.
As in Henderson (1974), we disregard the agricultural sector and assume
that all workers and ﬁrms are mobile; as in Tabuchi (1998), the dispersion
force rests on urban costs that rise with the size of the population established
within the same city. Such a setting, which combines the mobility of industry
and the existence of urban costs, strikes us as being more suitable to study
1Mano and Otsuka (2000) empirically demonstrate that urban costs have acted as a
strong dispersion force in the Japanese manufacturing activities.
2According to Mokyr (2002), the commuting costs in terms of time in the United States
can be roughly estimated at about $356 billion in 2000. However they are measured, the
importance of urban costs is not disputable.
2modern economies of the 21st century than is the standard core-periphery
model developed by Krugman (1991). It is worth stressing here that one of
the unsatisfactory aspects of new economic geography is the role ascribed
to the agricultural (or immobile) sector; and so for at least two reasons.
First, farmers are not allowed to move between regions and sectors, whereas
they actually do. Such moves are indeed at the origin of the urbanization
of industrialized countries. Second, although this sector acts as a dispersion
force, it must be suﬃciently large for dispersion to arise as an equilibrium
outcome (otherwise there is always agglomeration). All of this makes the
core-periphery model somewhat awkward to deal with the fast-growing mo-
bility of production factors.
Another drawback of the core-periphery model is the systematic focus on
the industry as a whole.3 T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h i sm o d e li sn o ta b l et oc o p e
with speciﬁc industries displaying diﬀerent spatial patterns. Yet, economic
geography has triggered a large number of empirical studies, surveyed in
Head and Mayer (2004), which all deal with several sectors. The secondary
purpose of this paper is to study the location of several industries and to in-
vestigate what the prediction of the one-sector model becomes in this context.
Speciﬁcally, we consider two industries that diﬀer in the cost of shipping their
output and show how such a diﬀerence may aﬀect their location.4
We obtain results similar to those obtained in the one-sector model when
commuting costs are large or small. However, by allowing for several in-
dustries to seek location, we also open the door to new and richer spatial
conﬁgurations for intermediate values of commuting costs, and this is be-
cause the industrial composition of regions is now endogenous. Among other
things, extending our basic model to two sectors allows us to get rid of one of
the “exotica” of the economic geography literature. Speciﬁcally, when there
are two sectors, we show that the agglomeration process is gradual and con-
tinuous. Thus, empirical studies should not search for catastrophic changes
in the economic landscape (Davis and Weinstein, 2002). This result, in turn,
allows us to study some new issues, such as regional specialization and urban
hierarchy, which cannot be properly addressed in a model involving a single
3For noticeable exceptions, see Fujita, Krugman and Mori (1999) and Venables (1999).
4We want to stress the fact that this modeling strategy, though restrictive, is very
much in the tradition of Weber’s (1909) and Hoover’s (1948) location theory in which
diﬀerent transport costs may explain why ﬁrms belonging to diﬀerent industries obey
diﬀerent locational patterns. Therefore, our paper may be viewed as an attempt to connect
“classical” location theory and “new” economic geography.
3mobile sector. This is an important point because one of the most strik-
ing features of the space-economy is the existence of cities of diﬀerent sizes
showing contrasted internal production patterns. More precisely, we observe
large and small cities together with diversiﬁed and specialized cities, each
producing some goods for local consumption as well as other goods whose
consumption is spread over several cities (Henderson, 1988). This problem
is very complex, however, because workers choose the sector in which they
work as well as the place where they live. This in turn implies that the size
of each sector, not just the size of each city, is endogenous.
In order to make our model comparable to the existing literature, we be-
gin with the study of the location of one industry. It is worth mentioning
r i g h ta w a yt h a to u rs e t t i n gl e a d st or e s u l t st h a td i ﬀer from those obtained in
the standard core-periphery model. Even though the general pattern of one
industry against declining commuting costs is fairly similar to the one ob-
tained in the standard core-periphery model when transport costs decrease
(see Proposition 1), there are striking diﬀerences. For example, it appears
that product diﬀerentiation acts here as a dispersion force. As all consumers
are mobile, price competition fosters agglomeration because workers are to
be compensated for the high urban costs associated with the emergence of a
larger city. Likewise, there is now insuﬃcient agglomeration in that the mar-
ket outcome sustains dispersion for a range of commuting costs for which
agglomeration is socially desirable. All of this suﬃces to show that using a
dispersion force other than the immobile sector may drastically aﬀect the con-
clusions derived from the standard core-periphery model. As a consequence,
policy recommendations based on standard economic geography models have
to be applied with extreme caution.
In the case of two industries, commodity-speciﬁc transport costs may
lead to equilibria in which diﬀerent sectors display diﬀerent spatial conﬁgu-
rations, ranging from full dispersion to full agglomeration, as in the foregoing
case. Unfortunately, allowing for both regional and sectoral mobility of work-
ers renders the analysis especially complex and prevents a full analysis of the
equilibrium conﬁgurations. This leads us to investigate the special, but mean-
ingful, case of an industry with negligible (zero) transport costs, whereas the
other faces positive costs. We show that the imperfectly mobile good sector
is agglomerated whereas the footloose sector is partially dispersed. To us,
this is indication of regional specialization, even though full specialization
never arises as a stable equilibrium outcome.
In order to gain further insights, we consider another extreme case in
4which one good is perfectly mobile while the other good is nontradeable. In-
deed, despite strong decreases in transport and communication costs, many
consumer services are supplied locally often in large cities (Daniels, 1993). In
such a context, the equilibrium involves a Christaller-like central place pat-
tern in that one city supplies more varieties of each good than the other.I n
addition, our equilibrium pattern also implies that the large city supplies a
relatively larger share of the nontradeable good, which allows it to attract
a larger share of the perfectly mobile good industry. This can be viewed as
a comparative advantage à la Ricardo, the intensity of which is endogenous
instead of being given a priori. Finally, although we assume no technolog-
ical linkage between sectors, cities are diversiﬁed in that they involve ﬁrms
belonging to each industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is intro-
duced in section 2. Instead of using the Dixit-Stiglitz-iceberg framework, we
retain the alternative model developed by Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse
( 2 0 0 2 )b e c a u s ei tl e a d st oa n a l y t i c a lr e s u l t st h a tm a yb ed e r i v e dw i t hp a p e r
and pencil. In section 3, we consider the case of a single sector. The case of
two industries is considered in section 4, whereas section 5 concludes.
Related literature. Even though the pioneering works of Christaller
(1933) and Lösch (1940) are now fairly old and despite the importance of
the questions these authors address for trade and development, it is only re-
cently that such issues have attracted attention in the economics profession.
This has been accomplished in the context of systems of cities (see Abdel-
Rahman (2000) for a detailed survey of the existing literature). However,
the corresponding models often fail to stress their trade and factor mobil-
ity implications. One prominent exception is the work of Henderson (1974,
1988), who considers a setting in which returns to scale are constant at the
ﬁrm’s level but increasing in the aggregate once they are located together.
Workers consume land and face positive commuting costs within each city.
Put together, these two forces imply that each city has a positive and ﬁnite
size. Because of increasing returns, it is eﬃcient for each city to be special-
ized in the production of a particular good. Accordingly, Henderson ends
up with an urban system having cities of diﬀerent sizes and types according
to the good they produce. However, shipping a city’s output is costless in
his setting, which amounts to treating cities like ﬂoating islands. Hence, we
do not know where cities are on the map, nor does Henderson provide an
explanation for a system involving both diversiﬁed and specialized cities.
52T h e m o d e l
Consider an economy formed by a continuum of mobile workers whose mass
is 1, by two regions, denoted H and F, and by three goods. The ﬁrst good
is homogenous and available as an endowment; it can be shipped costlessly
between the two regions and is chosen as the numéraire. The second one
is a diﬀerentiated good made available under the form of a continuum of
varieties. The utility function of a worker deﬁn e do nt h e s et w og o o d si sa s
follows:5


















in which N stands for the number of varieties of the diﬀerentiated good,
q(j) for the quantity of variety j and q0 for the quantity of the numéraire.6
Both α and β are positive, whereas γ is positive (resp., negative) if varieties
are substitutes (resp., complements). For the utility to be quasi-concave, we
assume β > γ.
The third good is land (or housing). In order to keep matters simple,
we consider the case of a one-dimensional continuous space in which each
location has a unit amount of land. Each region has a spatial extension
and involves a linear city whose center is given but with a variable size. The
city center stands for a central business district (CBD) in which all ﬁrms
locate once they have chosen to set up in the corresponding region.7 The two
CBDs are two remote points of the location space. Interregional trade ﬂows
go from one CBD to the other. While ﬁrms are assumed not to consume
land, workers when they live in a certain region, are urban residents who
5This utility is the one proposed by Vives (1990), which slightly diﬀers from that used
by Ottaviano et al. (2002). It has been chosen because the coeﬃcients a, b and c deﬁned
below are independent of the number of varieties supplied by a sector, which is variable
in the two-sector model.
6The third term in the RHS of (1) is divided by N, as in the case where all varieties
of the diﬀerentiated good are consumed (q(j) > 0 for all j). When this does not hold, N
must be replaced by the measure of the support of the function q(j). The same restriction
applies to (6) deﬁn e di ns e c t i o n4 .
7See Fujita and Thisse (2002) for various arguments explaining why ﬁrms want to be
agglomerated in a CBD.
6consume land and commute to the regional CBD in which jobs and varieties
of the diﬀerentiated good are available. Hence, unlike Krugman (1991) but
like Tabuchi (1998), each agglomeration has a spatial extension that imposes
commuting and land costs on the corresponding workers.8 For simplicity,
workers consume a ﬁxed lot size normalized to unity, while commuting costs
are linear in distance, the commuting cost per unit of distance being given
by θ > 0 units of the numéraire. The opportunity cost of land is normalized
to zero.9 Assume that λr workers live in region r = H,F,w h e r eλr denotes
the share of workers residing in region r with λH + λF =1 .A t t h e l a n d
market equilibrium, all workers in region r are equally distributed around
the r-CBD and, since they earn the same wage, reach the same utility level.
Furthermore, since each of them consumes one unit of land, the equilibrium
land rent at distance x ≤ λr/2 from the r-CBD is given by
R
∗(x)=θ(λr/2 − x)
When the land rents go to absentee landlords, individual urban costs, deﬁned
b yc o m m u t i n gc o s tp l u sl a n dr e n ta te a c hd i s t a n c ex,a r eg i v e nb yθλr/2. In
order to close the model, we assume that land is publicly owned and that
the aggregate land rent is equally redistributed among the r-city workers.
Consequently, the individual urban costs after redistribution are equal to






λr + q0 = q0 + wr
where pr(j) is the consumer price of variety j in region r, qr(j) the individual
demand for variety j of a worker residing in region r,a n dwr t h ew a g es h e
earns in this region. The initial endowment q0 is supposed to be suﬃciently
large for its equilibrium consumption to be positive for each individual.
Let a ≡ α/β, b ≡ 1/(β − γ) and c ≡ γ/[β(β − γ)],w i t hb>c .T h e




8To be precise, Helpman (1998) assumes a ﬁxed supply of housing that has no spatial
extension so that his model does not include commuting costs.
9It would be interesting to assume that the opportunity cost of land diﬀers between
the two regions in order to study the impact of previous and diﬀerent land uses on the
size and industrial composition of cities. Unfortunately, the analysis becomes intractable
in the two-sector case.





Each variety is supplied by a single ﬁrm producing under increasing re-
turns so that N is also the number of ﬁrms. The common ﬁxed cost is denoted
by φ whereas the marginal cost is set equal to zero so that the number of
ﬁrms N is equal to 1/φ. Each variety can be shipped at a positive cost of τ
units of the numéraire. Markets are segmented, that is, each ﬁrm is able to
set a price speciﬁc to the market in which its output is sold. This assumption
is supported by empirical investigations (Head and Mayer, 2000) and can be
given some theoretical justiﬁcation (Thisse and Vives, 1988). Because ﬁrms
l o c a t e di nr e g i o nr are symmetric, they charge the same price in equilibrium.
Hence, the proﬁts made by a ﬁrm located in region r = H,F may be written
as follows:
Πr = prrqr(prr)λr +( prs − τ)qs(prs)λs − φwr
where prr and prs are respectively the prices quoted by a ﬁrm located in r
and selling in r and in s 6= r.
The labor market clearing condition in region r implies that any change
in the population of workers in this region must be accompanied by a corre-
sponding change in the number of ﬁrms. As in Krugman (1991), entry and
e x i ta r ef r e es ot h a tp r o ﬁts are zero in equilibrium. The equilibrium wage
wr in region r is then obtained from the zero-proﬁt condition evaluated at
the equilibrium prices. These two assumptions have a major implication for
our analysis: it is suﬃcient to describe the migration of workers because the
supply of entrepreneurs in each region is supposed to be large enough for the
zero-proﬁt condition to be satisﬁed regardless of the number of workers.
Prices and wages are determined instantaneously once workers have made
their locational decisions. Stated diﬀerently, equilibrium prices and wages
depend on the interregional distribution of workers (λr). This distribution
depends itself on the transport costs τ and the commuting costs θ. I ti sa
well-documented fact that both types of costs have dramatically decreased
since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution (Bairoch, 1985), although
the commuting costs are often neglected in the general economics literature.
In this paper, we focus instead on commuting costs because transport costs
of many commodities are now very low.
83 The one-sector economy
3.1 Market equilibrium
It is easy to show that the equilibrium prices and wages corresponding to λr























Thus, equilibrium prices and wages depend on the distribution of ﬁrms be-
tween regions but not on the total number of ﬁrms. Two-way trade occurs
for any λr if
τ < τtrade ≡
2a
2b − c
The welfare of a worker in region r is given by her indirect utility Vr eval-
uated at the prevailing equilibrium prices and wages, which depend them-
selves on the distribution λr of workers. A spatial equilibrium thus arises
when no worker has a unilateral incentive to move from her location (Nash).
More precisely, such an equilibrium arises at 0 < λ
∗







r)=0 ,o ra tλ
∗
r =1when ∆V (1) ≥ 0,o ra tλ
∗
r =0when
∆V (0) ≤ 0.
In general, models of economic geography involves several equilibria.
Even though these models are static, stability is used as a reﬁnement to
eliminate some of them. Here, we follow a now well-established tradition in
migration modeling by assuming that workers are attracted (resp., repelled)
by regions having a utility higher (resp., lower) than the average utility. Such
a gradual migration process is due to the fact that workers have diﬀerent mov-
ing costs. It is also assumed that the power of attraction of such a region is
likely to increase with its size because this makes it more “visible”. Formally,
this means that we use the replicator (Weibull, 1995; Fujita, Krugman and
Venables, 1999):10
·
λr = λr([Vr(λr) − λrVr(λr) − λsVs(λr)] = λr (1 − λr)∆V (λr)
10Note also that the myopic migration behavior implied by (3) provides a good approx-
imation of foward-looking behavior when individual adjustment costs are not too small
(Baldwin, 2001; Ottaviano et al., 2002).
9A spatial equilibrium is asymptotically stable if, for any marginal deviation
of the population distribution from the equilibrium, the equation of motion
above brings the distribution of skilled workers back to the original one.
When some skilled workers move from one region to the other, we assume
that local labor markets adjust instantaneously. Wages are then adjusted for
each ﬁrm to earn zero proﬁts.
It is then readily veriﬁed that
∆V (λr)=K (1/2 − λr) (3)
where
K ≡




is a constant. It follows immediately from (3) that λ
∗
r =1 /2 is always a spatial
equilibrium. Furthermore, the symmetric equilibrium is stable if K>0.
Otherwise, the industry is agglomerated into a single region, with λ
∗
r =0 ,1
according to the initial distribution.




bτ [4a(3b − c) − (6b2 − 6bc + c2)τ]
(2b − c)
2 φ
It is readily veriﬁed that θ
∗ > 0 as long as τ does not exceed τtrade.T h e
following result thus holds:
Proposition 1 If θ > θ
∗, then the symmetric conﬁguration is the only sta-
ble spatial equilibrium; if θ < θ
∗, there are two stable spatial equilibria corre-
sponding to the agglomerated conﬁgurations; if θ = θ
∗,t h e na n yc o n ﬁguration
is a spatial equilibrium.
This result exhibits the evolutionary process from dispersion to agglom-
eration as θ decreases. We have here a setting that bears some resemblance
with the core-periphery model developed by Krugman (1991) and by Otta-
viano et al. (2002) in that improvements in intraregional (instead of interre-
gional) transport technologies induce the spatial transition from dispersion to
agglomeration. In particular, the transition is still of a catastrophic nature.
Next, it is readily veriﬁed that
∂θ
∗/∂c>0
10which does not agree with Krugman (1991) and Ottaviano et al. (2002).
Stated diﬀerently, in the absence of an agricultural sector but in the presence
of urban costs, the closer the substitutes, the more likely the agglomeration
of the industry. Such a seemingly counterintuitive result may be explained
as follows. On the one hand, when there is no immobile demand, ﬁrms
supplying close substitutes have no reason to be dispersed because their de-
mand may be geographically concentrated. That is, price competition is an
agglomeration force when all consumers are mobile.11 On the other hand,
when there are urban costs, workers—hence ﬁrms—always have an incentive to
relax congestion (instead of price competition) by moving to the periphery.
Accordingly, agglomeration arises provided that ﬁrms sell close substitutes
because the price competition eﬀect is suﬃciently strong to compensate the
w o r k e r sf o rt h eh i g hu r b a nc o s t sa s s o c i a t e dw i t ha na g g l o m e r a t i o n .B yc o n -
trast, when substitutes are bad, the price competition eﬀect is too weak to
make up for the urban costs, so that dispersion prevails.
The impact of φ on θ
∗ is similar. When φ decreases, both the agglomera-
t i o nf o r c e( t h em a r k e ts i z ee ﬀect) and the dispersion force (the urban costs)
are weakened. This is because a new ﬁr mn e e d sl e s sw o r k e r st os e tu pi nt h e
region where the ﬁrm is launched. Yet, when ﬁxed costs are suﬃciently low,
our result shows that the former eﬀect dominates the latter, thus implying
that the industry is always agglomerated. Consequently, we may conclude
that, in the absence of an agricultural sector but in the presence of urban
costs, agglomeration is more likely when the degree of product diﬀerentia-
tion is low and when ﬁxed costs are low. This is the opposite of what has
been obtained in the core-periphery model (Fujita, Krugman and Venables,
1999; Ottaviano et al., 2002) and shows how diﬀerent the various modeling
strategies regarding the dispersion force may be.
Speciﬁcally, the agricultural sector and the urban costs play very diﬀerent
r o l e sa sd i s p e r s i o nf o r c e s . The intensity of the dispersion force generated by
an immobile demand decreases, as does the agglomeration force, when trans-
port costs decrease. What the core-periphery model shows is that the former
declines faster than the latter. By contrast, the dispersion force caused by
urban costs is unaﬀected by a fall in transport costs. Instead, agglomeration
is triggered by a fall in commuting costs.
Finally, we know that the sign of K changes at θ = θ
∗(τ). It is readily
11By contrast, price competition is a dispersion force when demand is immobile
(d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979)
11veriﬁed that θ
∗(τ) is a concave parabola passing through the origin and inter-
secting the τ- a x i sa tap o s i t i v ev a l u et h a te x c e e d sτtrade. Clearly, the domain
of admissible (τ,θ)-values inside (resp., outside) this parabola is such that the
stable equilibrium involves agglomeration (resp., dispersion) because K<0
(resp., K>0). Having said this, we ﬁnd it useful to reinterpret our results
to deal with the case where θ is constant whereas τ steadily decreases in
order to make our setting comparable to Helpman (1998). When urban costs
are suﬃciently large, the economy always involves dispersion. However, for
lower values of θ, as τ steadily decreases from τtrade, the economy moves from
agglomeration to dispersion at θ
∗(τ),t h u sc o n ﬁrming the numerical results
obtained by Helpman (1998).
3.2 Welfare
We now compare the market outcome with the optimal allocation. As usual,
in the ﬁr s tb e s tt h ep l a n n e ri sa b l et ou s el u m ps u mt r a n s f e r s( i )i no r d e rt o
assign any number of workers (or, equivalently, of ﬁrms) to a speciﬁcr e g i o n
and (ii) in order to pay for the loss ﬁrms may incur while pricing at marginal
cost. Because our setting assumes transferable utility, the planner chooses λ
in order to maximize the sum of individual indirect utilities:
W(λr) ≡ λrVr(λr)+( 1− λr)Vs(λr) (4)









sr = τ (5)
thus implying that operating proﬁts and, hence, wages are zero. Maximizing
(4) subject to (5) yields λr =1 /2 as a candidate for the optimum allocation
of workers. Examining the second order condition, we see that W(λr) is
concave (resp., convex) when τ is larger (resp., smaller) than the threshold
θ
o ≡
[4a − (2b − c)τ]τ
φ
Hence, the ﬁrst best optimum involves dispersion for θ > θ
o and agglomera-




o does not lead to straightforward conclusions. In-




[(b − c)(2b2 − 4bc + c2)τ − 4a(b2 − 3bc + c2)]τ
(2b − c)
2 φ
12is indeterminate and varies with the parameter values, as in Papageorgiou
and Pines (2000). For example, if the varieties are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated




o) holds. In the present
setting, besides the standard market distortion generated by monopolistic
competition, there is something like a “ﬁscal externality” on the land market
because workers underpay for the use of land. Indeed, the (average) urban
cost that enters the indirect utility after redistribution of the aggregate land
rent is equal to θλr/4, whereas the marginal cost is equal to θλr/2.T h i sﬁscal
externality pushes toward more agglomeration because it leads to lower urban
costs. As a result, it is hard to compare the market and the social outcomes.
In order to identify the impact of these two distortions, we consider the
situation in which the total land rent is not redistributed among workers but
goes to absentee landlords. In this case, the ﬁscal externality problem is ﬁxed
because the urban cost is identical to the social cost (see Proposition 5.1 in
Fujita (1989)): the average urban cost is now equal to θλr/2, i.e. the marginal
cost. The equilibrium threshold θ
∗ is no longer valid and the new threshold
is θ
∗∗ = θ
∗/2, which is still distorted by monopolistically competitive pricing




This inequality implies that, for intermediate values of the trade costs (θ
∗∗ <
θ < θ
o), the market provides insuﬃcient agglomeration.T h u s ,w eh a v e :
Proposition 2 If the aggregate land rent is given to absentee landlords, the
market outcome tends to be more dispersed than the socially desirable out-
come.
This is just the opposite of what Ottaviano and Thisse (2002) have ob-
tained. Once workers pay the true marginal urban cost, the only force that
pulls apart from the optimum is the home market eﬀect, which is known to
lead to excessive agglomeration. By contrast, when the ﬁscal externality is
at work, it may be strong enough to induce the market to provides excessive
agglomeration. These results are suﬃcient to show that the social desirability
of agglomeration may completely vary with the nature of the dispersion force,
thus inviting us to be very careful in policy recommendations.
134 The two-sector economy
4.1 The model
We now come to the case of two sectors. Assume that all varieties of each
good are consumed. The utility (1) may then be extended as follows:






















where qi(j) is the quantity of variety j of good i. In the RHS of (6), the
second term in each bracketed term is weighted by the relative size of its
sector Ni/(N1 + N2) to capture the idea that, everything else being equal,
an industry with a small range of varieties has less impact on the consumer
well-being than an industry with a large array of varieties.
Since β > γ, (6) encapsulates both a preference for diversity between
t h et w og o o d sa sw e l la sapreference for variety across varieties of the same
good. Assume, ﬁrst, that an individual consumes a given mass of Qi units of
good i =1 ,2 and that consumption of good i is uniform and equal to Qi/xi









































which is strictly increasing in xi for each i =1 ,2. Hence, xi = Ni must hold
for each good i, that is, each consumer prefers to consume all the varieties
of each of the N available goods. Assume now that the total consumption
Q = Q1 + Q2 is ﬁxed. Then, maximizing (7) with respect to Qi subject
to Q = Q1 + Q2 yields Q1 = Q2 = Q/2. In words, each good is equally
consumed and, hence, each variety of any good is equally consumed.
14There are several ways to make the two industries asymmetric: c1 6= c2
(diﬀerent degrees of product diﬀerentiation), φ1 6= φ2 (diﬀerent levels of
ﬁxed cost), and τ1 6= τ2 (diﬀerent transport costs). Since we focus on spatial
parameters and variables, it is worth investigating the impact of diﬀerent
transport costs with τ1 < τ2.
Let λir be the share of the labor force established in region r and working
for sector i. Because the sum of the λir is one, there are three endogenous
v a r i a b l e st ob ec o n s i d e r e d :λ1H, λ2H and λ1F. Since workers can change both





so that the number of varieties produced in each sector is now endogenous.
An individual working in sector i and residing in region r earns a wage equal









(λ1r + λ2r)+q0 = wir + q0
where the individual demand for the variety j of good i =1 ,2 by a worker















It follows from (8) that the demand qir(j) is aﬀected by Pir,w h i c hc o n s i s t so f
prices of varieties belonging to industry i in the two regions. As a result, the
cross-elasticity of demand between any two varieties belonging to diﬀerent
industries is zero, but is positive when they belong to the same industry.
This is consistent with the classical deﬁnition of an industry given by Triﬃn
(1940). The demand for each variety of good i is negatively aﬀected by
the share of the corresponding industry because consumers distribute their
consumption over a larger range of varieties.
As seen in the foregoing, one of the main diﬀerences with the one-sector
model is that the number of varieties Ni produced in industry i is endogenous,
15being determined by the sectoral mobility of workers. Equilibrium prices and




























which are independent of the number of ﬁrms operating in each sector. How-
ever, equilibrium prices and wages, hence the indirect utility, depend on the
distribution of the labor force across sectors as well as on the interregional
distribution of workers within each industry.T h i ss u ﬃces to show that the
analysis is likely to be much harder than in the one-sector model considered
above.
The welfare of an individual working in sector i in region r is given by her
indirect utility Vir evaluated at the foregoing equilibrium prices and wages.
A spatial-sectoral equilibrium thus arises when no worker has an incentive to
change place and/or to switch job. Formally, this means that V exists such
that
Vir = V if λ
∗
ir > 0
Vir ≤ V if λ
∗
ir =0
The value of w∗
ir reveals that the expression for Vir is highly nonlinear so that
the set of equilibria is very hard to characterize. Yet, because of sectoral
mobility, equilibrium wages must be equal across sectors in each region so
that we may write w∗
1r = w∗
2r = w∗
r (r = H,F). Note also that the expression
of w∗
iH shows that goods 1 and 2 are to be supplied in equilibrium because
λir + λis must be positive for i =1 ,2. However, we do not know whether or
not λir is uniquely determined in equilibrium.
Another diﬀerence with the one-sector model is that there is no natural
candidate to model the adjusment process. This is why we propose to study
stability through the replicator dynamics, thus treating the choice of a job












This means that workers out-migrate (resp., in-migrate) from sector i in re-
gion r when her utility Vir is lower (resp., higher) than the intersectional and
16interregional average utility. Among other things, this implies that intersec-
tional mobility and interregional mobility are determined simultaneously by
allowing them to interact in a symmetric manner. In addition, a change in
the population of industry i-workers in one region is no longer accompanied
by a corresponding change in the number of ﬁrms in that industry. Finally,
all spatial-sectoral equilibria are steady-states of (10). It is, indeed, easy to
show that fir =0when Vir is equal to the average utility for i =1 ,2 and
r = H,F,w h e r e a sλir =0when working in sector i in region r yields a utility
level lower than the average utility.
By solving V1H = V1F = V2H = V2F simultaneously, we can show that


























16a2 − 16a(b − c)τ1 +( 8 b2 − 12bc +5 c2)τ2
1




This equilibrium is interior. However, there are also equilibria involving
boundary and interior values, the set of which is much richer than what we
get in the one-industry case.
4.2 Agglomerated and dispersed equilibria
As seen above, there exists a fully dispersed equilibrium (11) for all τ1 < τ2.
We also know that, when both industries are dispersed, the low transport cost
industry attracts a larger share of the work force (when τ1 = τ2,w eh a v e
b µ1 =1 /2). This equilibrium becomes unstable at the symmetry breaking
point, which may be obtained by computing the Jacobian of (10) evaluated
at (11). More precisely, the characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian of (10)
may be written as follows:
ϕ(x)=x
3 + C1 (θ)x
2 + C2 (θ)x + C3 (θ)
where x stands for an eigenvalue. We know from Routh’s theorem that the
system is asymptotically stable if the following conditions hold (Samuelson,
1947, Appendix B):
C1 (θ) > 0 C3 (θ) > 0 C1 (θ)C2 (θ) >C 3 (θ) (12)
17This yields (at most) three lower bounds on θ. Clearly, the largest bound θ
∗
2
is the symmetry breaking point. Indeed, the symmetric equilibrium ceases
to be stable when θ < θ
∗
2.




















When both industries are agglomerated within the same region, the work










2s =0 . This is because the diﬀerences in transport costs no longer matter
once the two industries are together. This is an equilibrium if and only if the
following three conditions
V1r ≥ V1s V2r ≥ V2s V1r = V2r (14)
hold for r 6= s. The stability of this equilibrium is guaranteed because we
also have















1 be the sustain point associated with full agglomeration, which is the
unique solution of V1r = V1s evaluated at (13). At θ = θ
∗
1, the three conditions
(14) are satisﬁed because V1r = V1s and V1r = V2r hold when evaluated at





b[4a − (2b − c)(τ2 + τ1)](τ2 − τ1)
2(2b − c)φ
> 0
Hence, full agglomeration is a stable equilibrium when commuting costs are
suﬃciently low (θ < θ
∗
1).
The foregoing discussion may be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If θ > θ
∗
2, then full dispersion is a stable equilibrium. If
0 < θ ≤ θ
∗
1, then full agglomeration is a stable equilibrium.




2.I n t h e c a s e o f t w o




2) is typically nonempty and we expect
18some form of partial agglomeration to arise as an equilibrium outcome when
commuting costs take intermediate values. Unfortunately, due to the strong
nonlinearity of the equilibrium conditions, it is beyond our reach to determine
the whole set of stable equilibria against decreasing commuting costs. In
particular, some preliminary analysis reveals that equilibria vanish whereas
others emerge as these costs decrease. This makes the use of numerical
analysis fairly problematic. Thus, extending our model (and, since ours
is very simple, any economic geography model) to two sectors appears to
be a very diﬃcult task. This is why we choose to study two special, but
meaningful, cases in which good 1 can be carried at zero cost, whereas good
2 either is shipped at a positive cost lower that does not exceed τtrade or is
nontradeable.
4.3 Regional specialization
It is possible to show the existence of a unique stable equilibrium when one
good is perfectly tradeable. Formally, we assume from now on that good 1
can be shipped at zero cost from one region to the other: τ1 =0 . By setting






regardless of the region where the varieties are sold. Furthermore, proﬁts
being zero in each region, it must be that w∗
1r = w∗
1s. The mobility of workers

















holds in equilibrium. Consequently, whatever the equilibrium worker dis-
tribution, t h e r ei sn ow a g ed i ﬀerential between regions at the labor market
equilibrium once we allow for the existence of a footloose industry. Note,




1s changes with θ.
We are now able to provide a full characterization of the equilibrium
path. In the absence of good 2, the market equilibrium always involves
dispersion because workers seek to minimize urban costs. We will show that
t h ep r e s e n c eo fg o o d2 leads to a richer set of outcome for intermediate values
of commuting costs. When τ1 =0 , the sustain point and the symmetry


















2 holds. The symmetry breaking point θ
∗
2 is obtained as follows.
The stability conditions of the symmetric conﬁguration (12) become
θ − θA > 0 θ − θ
∗
2 > 0( θ − θA)(θ − θB) > (θ − θ
∗
2)





2 > θB can be shown to hold, θ
∗
2 is the symmetry breaking point.
Furthermore, it is easy to see that the equilibrium conditions V ∗
1H = V ∗
1F =
V ∗
2H = V ∗
2F yields a unique interior solution given by (11). So, when the
dispersed conﬁguration becomes unstable, it must be that some λir =0 .














2) (see Appendix 2 for the
values of λ
∗
ir). This means that the production of good 2 is fully concentrated
in region r whereas good 1 is produced in the two regions. As shipping good
1 is costless, a positive number of ﬁrms belonging to sector 1 ﬁnd it advan-
tageous to be located in region r (λ
∗
1r > 0). Indeed, in the case of fully
specialized regions à la Henderson (1974) (λ1r = λ2s =0 ), all workers in sec-
tor 1 would have to pay for shipping good 2 from region r. Simultaneously,
they would incur higher urban costs because λ1s > 1/2 as more than half
of the labor force works for sector 1. Clearly, such a conﬁguration cannot
be an equilibrium. By distributing themselves between the two regions, the
workers of sector 1 equalize the beneﬁts made by saving on the transport of
good 2 to the additional urban costs they generate by locating together with
the workers of sector 2. Furthermore, we also know that getting agglomer-
ated in the core region together with sector 1 (λ1s =0 ) is not an equilibrium
because commuting costs, hence urban costs, in region r would be too large.
Among other things, the foregoing equilibrium implies that trade in good 2
is unilateral, while trade in good 1 is bilateral.














1s decreases when θ decreases and reaches the value
200 when θ = θ
∗
1. Hence, region r accommodates an increasing number of
workers as commuting costs decrease. This is because the agglomeration
forces generated by the transport costs of good 2 is unaﬀected whereas the
dispersion force associated with the urban costs weakens. For a certain value
of θ, the majority of sector 1-workers live in region r,w h i c hb e c o m e sa









number of workers in sector 2 increases because the two industries tend to
congregate.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume that good 1 can be shipped as zero costs and good




2),t h e ni n d u s t r y2 is agglomerated. As θ
decreases, the share of industry 1 collocated with industry 2 rises, whereas
the share of the labor force working in sector 1 decreases.
The uneven distribution of workers implies the existence of an urban cost
diﬀerential. In equilibrium, this one is just compensated by the variety price
diﬀerential. In other words, s o m ew o r k e r sc h o o s et ol i v ei nt h el a r g e rc i t yi n
which they bear higher urban costs because they enjoy there the whole range
of varieties at lower prices. This is consistent with the empirical fact that, in
cities of diﬀerent sizes, the price index diﬀerential and/or the nominal wage
diﬀerential is lower than the diﬀerential in housing rent (Tabuchi, 2001).
Furthermore, the equilibrium distribution of industry 1 now varies continu-
ously with the parameter θ, unlike what we observe in the one-sector model.
This is suﬃcient to show that the existence of a catastrophic change in the
economic landscape is an artefact of the one-sector model.
4.4 Urban hierarchy
We now deal with another limiting case in which good 1 c a nb et r a d e da tz e r o
costs, whereas good 2 is nontradeable (τ2 >a / (b − c) so that even one-way
trade is precluded)—think of a business-to-consumer service industry. We will
see that the existence of such a nontradeable consumption good (other than
land) is suﬃcient to generate an urban hierarchy.12
Let the total number of varieties available in region r be Nr ≡ N1+λ2rN.
Since good 2 cannot be shipped, its price in each region is equal to p∗ ≡
12This idea has already been put foward by several authors (see Abdel-Rahman (2000)
for references).
21a/(2b − c),a ss h o w nb ym a x i m i z i n gprrqr(prr)(λ1r + λ2r). As the indirect


















2r) i =1 ,2,r = H,F (15)
an uneven distribution of workers implies the existence of an urban cost dif-
ferential (the third term in (15)). In equilibrium, this one is just compensated
by the diﬀerential in the number of varieties available in each region (the ﬁrst
term in (15)). In other words, workers now choose to live in a larger city in
which they bear higher urban costs because they enjoy there a larger variety
of diﬀerentiated services.











































































The ﬁrst equilibrium (16) involves full dispersion. This is always an equi-
librium, whatever the value of the commuting cost θ. However, (17) is an
equilibrium if and only if θ ∈ [2/T,3/T] b e c a u s ee a c hv a r i a b l em u s tb er e a l
and must take its values in [0,1]. This equilibrium can be shown to be
stable by applying Routh’s theorem to the characteristic polynomial of the





holds for i =1 ,2 eases the stability analysis when compared to the case





2r < 1/2 holds, thus implying that the industry producing the
nontradeable good is more agglomerated than the other. The two equilibria
coincide with full dispersion when θ =3 /T. On the other hand, (17) involves
full agglomeration (13) at θ =2 /T.T h u s ,θ =3 /T is the symmetry breaking
point and θ =2 /T is the agglomeration sustain point.
13The mirror image of the asymmetric equilibrium is disregarded.
22Since all possible equilibria have been accounted for, we may conclude
that the labor force is equally split between the two industries despite the fact
that workers can shift jobs. Indeed, when compared to ﬁrms producing a
costlessly tradeable good, ﬁrms producing a nontradeable good have fewer
customers, but each individual demand is higher. Because these two eﬀects
just cancel out, the labor share is never higher in one sector than in the other.
The foregoing argument may then be summarized as follows:
Proposition 5 Assume that good 1 c a nb et r a d e da tz e r oc o s t sw h e r e a sg o o d
2 is nontradeable. As θ decreases, there is only one stable equilibrium path:
(i) if θ ≥ 3/T, then each industry is fully dispersed; (ii) if 2/T < θ < 3/T,
then both industries are partially agglomerated within the same region and
the industry producing the nontradeable good is more agglomerated than the
industry producing the costlessly tradeable good; (iii) if θ ≤ 2/T,t h e nb o t h
industries agglomerate in one region.
The following remarks are in order. First, although varieties of good 1 can
be shipped at zero cost, the existence of a nontradeable good allows for a well-
deﬁned distribution of industry 1 between regions. More precisely, except
for fairly high commuting costs (θ ≥ 3/T), t h en o n t r a d e a b l es e c t o ra c t sa sa
centripetal force that yields partial or full agglomeration of the other industry.
When commuting costs are suﬃciently low (θ ≤ 2/T), the two industries are
located into a single region while the other region is empty. As discussed
above, the availability of more diﬀerentiated services compensates workers
for the higher urban costs they bear within the agglomeration.
Second, the locational pattern chosen by each of the two industries is in
general diﬀerent. T h i si sb e c a u s et h ef o o t l o o s ei n d u s t r yd o e sn o tc a r ea
priori about its location, whereas the service industry cares about the spatial
distribution of its demand. As a result, the former industry tends to be more
dispersed than the latter industry. This agrees with empirical facts: within
modern cities, the share of the manufacturing industries tends to be smaller
than the share of the service sectors.14 However, one region accommodates
14For example, the Tokyo Metropolitan Area consists of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba and
Saitama prefectures, whose population share is 26% in 1996. Its employment share is 24%
in manufacturing industries, which is slightly less than population. However, the service
sectors are more concentrated than population: the employment share is 30% in transport
and communications, 32% in wholesale, 33% in restaurants and bars, 35% in ﬁnance and
insurance, and 40% in real estate.
23more than half of each industry. As a result, the market outcome involves an
urban hierarchy in that, for each good, a larger array of varieties is produced
within the same city.
Third, according to export-base theory (Richardson, 1978), a strong ex-
port sector, such as low transport costs industries, is a powerful engine of
regional development in that it attracts the service sectors. Proposition 5
just says the opposite. When the agglomeration process begins (i.e. when
T takes intermediate values), the service sector is always more agglomerated
than the export sector. In other words, it is the agglomeration of the ser-
vice industry that causes here the agglomeration of the export industry.T h i s
diﬀerence in results is due to the fact that the export-base theory relies on
intermediate services whereas we focus here on consumer services.
Fourth, and last, we can compute the labor share of industry 1 in each
region. Using the equilibrium values (17), we obtain
√



















where the inequalities are strict for all θ ∈ (2/T,3/T). This implies that the
large region r has a larger labor share in industry 2 whereas the small region
s has a larger labor share in industry 1. This is consistent with Ricardo’s
comparative advantage theory when each region is partially specialized in
diﬀerent industries: the large region has here a comparative advantage in
the nontradeables because it has a larger market, whereas the small region
has a comparative advantage in terms of urban costs. Another important




1r ≥ 1/4: the large region r has a
larger share of each industry than the small region s, and the large region
r has more varieties of both goods than the small region. This agrees with
Christaller’s (1933) central place theory in which large cities have more ﬁrms
and varieties.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In the advanced societies of our new century, workers are likely to become
more and more mobile, while industries will become freer from immobile
production factors. Thus, although a model with an immobile sector but
without urban costs, such as the standard core-periphery model, is applicable
to the time of the Industrial Revolution, a model with no immobile sector
24but with urban costs, such as the one considered in this paper, seems to be
more suitable to our time.
Having said that, we may summarize our main results as follows. In the
one-sector model, we obtain the standard evolutionary pattern of economic
geography: the economy moves from dispersion to agglomeration as commut-
ing costs decrease, but the impact of the main parameters of the economy on
t h em a r k e to u t c o m ed i ﬀer. In the two-sector model, these two conﬁgurations
emerge for high and low commuting costs only. For intermediate values,
the set of equilibria is much richer in that they typically involve regional
specialization and urban hierarchy. Thus, in conducting empirical studies,
economists should not take the predictions of the standard core-periphery
model at face value.
In this paper, we have chosen to focus on industries that diﬀer only in
terms of transport costs. The next line of research to be addressed is the
location of several industries which diﬀer in several structural parameters,
for example diﬀerent market sizes as well as diﬀerent ﬁxed production costs
and transport costs. Such an analysis would accomplish what Lösch aimed
at doing but did not succeed to do. Similarly, we have used the framework of
economic geography that typically involves two regions. Our model should be
extended to an arbitrary number of regions in order to build a more general
theory of urban systems.
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2s =0is a stable equilibrium
When λ
∗
2s =0 ,s o l v i n gV1r = V1s and V1r = V2r yields
λ∗
1r =
τ2 [2a − (b − c)τ2]
h
2b2 (b − c)τ2
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Furthermore, evaluating the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of
( ·
λ1r = λ1r (V1r − λ1rV1r − λ2rV2r − λ1sV1s)
·
λ2r = λ2r (V2r − λ1rV1r − λ2rV2r − λ1sV1s)





















2r increase when θ decreases and reaches the value 1/2 at
θ = θ
∗
1,w h e r e a sλ
∗





1s =0solving V1r = V2r and V2r = V2s with θ = θ
∗
2,w e
obtain a cubic function for λ
∗
1r. By examining it, all its solutions are be either
greater than 1/2 or complex numbers. Given λ
∗







2s) / ∈ [0,1], thus implying that there is no equilibrium such
that λ
∗








2s =0is the unique (stable)
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